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DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCES

THE SUMMARY OF THESIS

*Romania's priorities regarding the comprehensive approach of the security in Southern
Caucasus and Central Asia from the OSCE perspective*

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Summary

The thesis "*Romania's priorities regarding the comprehensive approach of the security in Southern Caucasus and Central Asia from the OSCE perspective*" aims to contribute to the existing specialized literature with a distinct approach by means of clarifying mechanisms and institutions that are involved in the activity corresponding to the three dimensions of the comprehensive security concept, and the proper identification of the context of security in the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia areas. The approach that I have considered does not imply critical or even scholastic perspectives of certain previous studies, the OSCE perspective being the basis for the foreign policy of these countries along with the manner in which Romania has contributed to promoting security in the above-mentioned regions. Therefore, the thesis, structured in six chapters, is mainly aimed to addressing various aspects of security in the OSCE area and their interference on the activities in Southern Caucasus and Central Asia with a specific focus on corresponding challenges and threats.

The selection of issues contained in this paper is based on the definition of "comprehensive security" - as it is used today so as to include a quite considerable number of topics that are related to political and military aspects of security, human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy, tolerance, rule of law, national minorities, human and international contacts and the „presence” of security which is ensured by means of economic and environmental factors.

The paper analyzed the mechanisms of monitoring the implementation of the commitments assumed by the OSCE participating states within the framework of these three dimensions and the OSCE institutions mandates. A central part of the work is devoted to the Romanian contribution towards the comprehensive promotion of these dimensions, with emphasis on the issues related to Southern Caucasus and Central Asia.

The introduction presents the importance and relevance of the topic, followed by the identification of the research objectives that have been observed and analyzed in the content of the paper. I have emphasized in the introductory chapter the OSCE as a unique and innovative process in many respects by its continuous action of "Europeanization" regarding the security concepts that defined the foreign relations after postwar transformation which, finally, have brought to the table of negotiations neutral, non-aligned states, with members of the opposing military alliances.

The historical evolution of this organization necessitates the presentation of the context in which it has appeared, under the original aegis of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. I have stressed the reference to the historical moment, namely the coverage of international political relations during the "Cold War", but also the transformation of the CSCE into the OSCE, as an organic process of continuous evolution, ongoing guidance to the

most appropriate formula in respect of particular difficult situations for the development of the region. The brief presentation of the historical evolution has resulted in broadening the area of cooperation among states and introducing new fields of cooperation in the analysis. At this point it is required to explain the progress that has characterized the geopolitical context and has especially contributed to the OSCE unfolding process of the after the Cold War, marked by the spirit of the time, more exactly, the degree of optimism that was expressed in the Charter of Paris for a new Europe and other OSCE documents that were adopted in the early nineties of last century.

Moreover, I should mention that the present thesis is focused on the changes and the implications of signing the Helsinki Final Act from 1975, an event that determined the CSCE/OSCE, to accumulate a significant number of commitments following this interval of time.

The world has changed since 1975 and up to present, as well as the tools of the international community, especially of the OSCE, to promote its commitments. Many of the documents have since become standards for other international organizations. One such example was the acquis on human rights that was adopted at the Conference on the Human Dimension (Copenhagen, 1990), where the OSCE participating states have established a set of standards that was not reached up to that date and it is still continuing to determine the activity and evaluation of their level of democratic development. The above-mentioned set of values was retrieved later by the European Union and used as a basis for assessing the political criteria for the candidates to the EU accession.

The political implications of OSCE commitments have been used as basis in order to highlight their uniqueness for several reasons. To begin with, they apply to a higher level than the one given by recognized international standard; secondly, these standards apply to all participating states, since decisions are taken by consensus; no participating state can justify a selective implementation of some commitments. Thirdly, OSCE considers that the commitments implementation by any of the participating states is actually a concern of all states, and this aspect was particularly expressed in the human dimension content as was agreed at the Moscow Conference on 1991. While presenting the historical evolution of this organization [I noticed (and reviewed) the existence of an impressive number of assets allocated to the human dimension, none existing in the nineties of last century.

Comprehensively addressing the security concept, the Helsinki Final Act was the first international document that specified human rights and fundamental freedoms as an issue of concern to the international community and its corresponding subjects. Therefore, from this very moment, the protection of rights and fundamental freedoms has become one of the ten fundamental principles governing international relations, having been granted the same status and level of the other principles that represent classical postulates of international relations of the early modern area.

To continue with, I also reviewed aspects of economic and environmental impact, an important part of OSCE activities, reflecting, actually, the comprehensive approach of the Organization on security.

Further on, I have analyzed the significance of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, when the participating states have "distributed" the activities of the organization in "dimensions" while economic and environmental dimension have constituted what states labeled „the II-nd basket", namely the area of concern on security issues deriving from economic development or the absence of it, science, technology, environmental protection.

During "the wind of changes" in Central and Eastern Europe, many ideologists of socialism (Soviet school) recognized that the communist economy had reached its limits. They were not able to recognize that it was a bankrupt system since it meant practically the absolute power loss. However, they aimed to reform "top-down" the production system in order to insert certain particular economic "valves", hoping that the „market“ will be in the position to replace what the planned economic system had failed to achieve.

In order to highlight the above-mentioned fact, I have identified the manner in which the participating states of the communist bloc have introduced in the Helsinki Final Act, a "loophole" to legitimize their efforts to overcome stagnation and to revive their own economic system, in order to face the competition from the obviously superior model of Western economic efficiency. Thus, the document stipulated that "efforts to develop cooperation in trade, industry, science and technology, environment and other economic fields contribute to the strengthening of peace and security in Europe and all around the world"¹.

The political situation was not "totally contoured" as the socialist system had sufficient remaining development resources. In the political arena the economic reforms were approved in the very moment of appointing Gorbachev as head of USSR along with the initiation of corresponding attempts of adapting the economy to methods that were perceived as being effective². These attempts have been, in fact, approaches of "embellishment" of centralized economy, but having a consistent drawback: they functioned within the framework of the CMEA with some states still preserving the memory of the capitalist market system preceding the World War II. In addition, the initial attempts proved to bring certain side effects that were considered undesirable by the promoters - the emergence of new economic elites whose interest was focused, in fact, on the promoting profound structural economic reforms. The new elites were aware that these reforms could not have been promoted unless the political system of that period was changed.

Documentary basis

The specific information of the thesis is based on the primary published and open to public documents that have been signed or adopted³ by the OSCE participating states on the occasion of various meetings and CSCE/OSCE summits. Among the bibliographic sources, a series of papers and studies have been considered and used, mainly published by international relations research institutions, as well as others think tanks having taken into consideration the OSCE activity, namely CORE - Center for OSCE Research, Hamburg. Moreover, I have also used my personal experience within the organization, allowing me to directly observe the

¹ The Helsinki Final Act, the chapter *Cooperation in the area of economy, science, technology and environment*, stamp 1, p 17.

² "Hozrasciot" part of the "perestroika" concept in the USSR, "economic and financial self-management" in the policy of building the multilaterally developed socialist society as regards the Republic of Romania or other similar variations in the socialist countries.

³ CSCE / OSCE documents are political documents reflecting the political structure of the organization. These documents were not legally binding under the law of treaties in accordance with the international law. In general, basic documents such as the Helsinki Final Act and the highest level declarations were signed, while at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs or the Permanent Council members, the documents were adopted by consensus. This practice is maintained until the present day. In consequence, their signature or adoption implied the assuming of political commitments adopted by consensus and politically mandatory for each participating state, beginning with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.

process of preparation, negotiation, adoption of various programmatic documents, along with the way the documents were perceived during the discussion with partners and during their implementation in different situations and circumstances.

The structure of the paper

The paper is structured as follows: the introduction, six chapters, conclusion and bibliography.

The first chapter deals with the security risks that are specific to the political-military dimension in the OSCE. I have presented the main references that have led to the appearance of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, with special attention being paid to the Helsinki process and to the transformation of CSCE into OSCE. I have pointed out certain specific tools for the risks prevention as regards the security of the political-military dimension in the OSCE. I have intended to emphasize the idea that OSCE played the role of initiator of confidence building measures and comprehensive pan-European security. The same logic strain of thought has functioned as basis for the analysis of three political-military instruments - Code of Conduct on political-military aspects of security (Code of Conduct), regional arms control agreements (Articles II, IV and V of the Peace Agreement from Dayton) and the 'Open Sky' Treaty.

The second chapter refers to the Treaty on limitation of conventional weapons in Europe - the cornerstone of developing the security system in Europe. I underlined the key elements that have marked the negotiation of CFE Treaty, as well as the causes that have determined the adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in order to fight against the security risks within the OSCE area. In this context, certain approaches and positions on the CFE regime have been taken into consideration, namely the coordinates of its adaptation and Romania's position on the decision to adapt the CFE Treaty, including the specific legal approach in respect of the ratification process as a reflection on the security interests of Romania. The Russian Federation failure to implement this treaty has led to a review of the entire content of the debate on European security, especially after the events in Georgia (August 2008). Consequently I have conducted a review of the implications of European security in the context of Corfu process and the need to adapt OSCE to new realities.

The third chapter of the thesis featured the relevance of the police activities in Southern Caucasus and Central Asia focused on a **detailed presentation Romania's involvement** leading to adoption of political decisions by the OSCE Ministerial Council in Bucharest, December 2001, regarding the development of OSCE police activities in the countries of Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. The premise of the thesis assesses that the states of the above mentioned areas ought to be helped so as to determine a certain conduct of democratic institutions in accordance with the commitments that have been assumed at the moment of accession. Further on, the issues Romania has been involved in are presented in detail along with examples of good practices for the states of the region and a schematic approach of the crisis of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

The position of Romania at the external border of the EU in immediate contact with the respective area might only lead to a mobilization of efforts. In addition, the political-military cooperation history and the contacts that were established with those states eventually increased the Romanian influence in the region.

The fourth chapter of the thesis is dedicated to **the economic dimension**. I analyzed separately a number of three important meetings on the of environmental and economic dimension organized during CSCE: the Scientific Forum in Hamburg (1980), the meeting on

environmental protection in Sofia (1989) and, the most important of them, the Bonn Conference on Economic Cooperation in Europe (1990). These events are presented both in terms of the mandate of Romanian delegation and its objectives considered actual for the security and stability of northern hemisphere: alternative energy sources, food production, medicine, humanities and social sciences. The main objective was to present the framework of the Scientific Forum in Hamburg, the manner in which the concepts were approached at the meeting on environmental protection in Sofia, the refining of aspects as regards transition to market economy, as they were provided by the Conference in Bonn along with the directions of Maastricht Strategy. I mentioned the relevance for OSCE brought by the EU economic integration, the establishment and proper functioning of the Central European Free Trade Area, as well as the Community of the Independent States as engines for international cooperation, lowering the tensions and promotion of economic security. I also pondered upon the limits of the economic and environmental dimension within the framework of the general constraints and trends concerning the OSCE participating states. A special attention was paid to the discussions on the OSCE reform as a compromise formula to revitalize the organization.

The **fifth chapter, "The human dimension"** refers to the "mechanisms and institutions as regards the implementation of commitments of OSCE participating states in the field of human dimension". Further on, this chapter provides an overview of the manner in which the OSCE participating states have assumed and exercised their responsibility for enforcing specific commitments, the way the debates have been organized in this area and the character of "sources of obligations" these meetings have had. The chapter presents, briefly, the two mechanisms for the implementation of human dimension commitments that are available to the OSCE participating states, as well as the adequate instruments of the institutions offering assistance and contributing to the uniform implementation of these commitments by the participating states. I reviewed the functions of OSCE institutions, namely the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the way it has focused its entire activity on the building and developing a democracy culture that promotes human rights, ensures the transfer of democratic and legal precepts into concrete daily activity by the authorities of participating states.

I stressed that ODIHR ensures the dialogue between the governments of participating states and their civil society by supporting the organization's annual human dimension implementation meeting. The most known activity ODIHR is represented by the organization and monitoring the elections.

ODIHR democratization activities are developed by means of long term programs designed to provide assistance to OSCE participating states governments in becoming more transparent, responsible as regards their society members. The areas that are covered by these activities were: the rule of law, democratic governance, gender equality, migration and freedom of movement, support of the legislative process⁴.

⁴ It would be interesting to note that, following the ODIHR interim reports on parliamentary elections in Georgia, 2003, presidential elections in Ukraine in 2004, as well as the parliamentary elections of Kirgizstan in 2005, the national authorities were forced by street movements to adopt recommendations of the ODIHR reports and to organize new elections that resulted in the victory of the ones who were wronged in the election process. ODIHR success and political influence among the civil society and the parties that intended to be considered democratic of the South Caucasus states and Central Asia, being considered close proximity of the Russian Federation, had determined Moscow to adopt a quite acid reaction as regards the ODIHR activity and limit by means of procedural actions the impact of this office in the corresponding area of responsibility of the OSCE

If the ODIHR activities related to rule of law consolidation contributes significantly to promoting judicial reforms by supporting professional training programs and assistance for judges, lawyers, prosecutors and government representatives or for the ones that belong to the civil society, the ODIHR activities related to democratic governance have considered a wider range targeting both the government sector and that of civil society.

In the chapter's second part, I have analyzed the role of High Commissioner for National Minorities (HCNM). One of the most important tasks of the HCNM is to work with governments of OSCE participating States in a climate of complete trust.

The activity has proved successful so far and has resulted not only in the reports that were sent to the interested parts, but also in a series of recommendations⁵ which the participating states generally take notice of, particularly when applying certain projects the aim of which being the improvement of institutional capacity and practices as regards the rights of national minorities. The fact according to which no failure in HCNM work has been recorded due to the manner of selecting the time regarding the corresponding intervention along with the high degree of confidence.

In this chapter, I have observed the perspective of the dual approach (R.S.) that Romania has adopted, within the OSCE on the "human dimension" as a fundamental pillar of comprehensive security in the European continent. Thus, taken into consideration the Romanian contribution in respect of promoting human dimension between duality and realism, I have emphasized the contextual location given by the conditions according to which the Cold War constituted the main manner of manifestation of international relations in Europe, mentioning that both the period of tension and the calm that followed it were not sufficient to ensure security and stability guarantees, either for the Western bloc or Eastern Block.

I have highlighted a unique particular experience concerning the use of the concept as a tool to promote the security interests of geopolitical origin, and further on, to assume the values of this dimension, as the outcome of the reforms that were introduced after the events of 1989.

Another issue I have focused on in this chapter was Romania's contribution to the OSCE in implementing human dimension commitments in Central Asia and Southern Caucasus, starting from the dual experience of our country within the framework of the organization. At that time, the CSCE/OSCE and the corresponding institutions along with the field missions have widely used "soft" measures to promote security by means of verbal attention, a critical attitude towards the lack of dialogue or international isolation, even in the situation in which a third part as regards the conflicts of the region was very active in promoting and displaying a high potential for blackmail.

The opening of missions or centers in most countries of the region, and their development as regional offices of the organization that are accredited in the corresponding states of residence has determined CSCE/OSCE to limit or prevent the effects of instability and insecurity. These missions have approached certain structural aspects of the conflicts and played important contributions especially in the areas of the human dimension: institution building, monitoring

⁵ The Recommendations have public character and are at the disposal of those interested. Among them are present the right to education of the persons belonging to national minorities; the corresponding rights of these persons to use the mother tongue; the participation of national minorities as regards public life; Tv reports in the respective mother tongues; the activities of police in multi-ethnic societies.

of elections, promoting human rights and national minorities, institutional support on border management area of police activities, the security sector reform and civil society development⁶. In this context, the CSCE/OSCE was the main reference for democratic (re)construction for the newly independent states of the Euro-Asian area.

Romania is one of the democracies of the continent that has greatly benefited from the OSCE experience and tools in its efforts to build a democratic society based on the rule of law and respect of human rights along with human fundamental freedoms, including the rights of national minorities. Consequently, the individual experience of Romania and the corresponding transition from totalitarian to a democratic society have been examples for countries in the region, in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and cooperation. Among them, it is important to mention the positive development of relations with the High Commissioner on National Minorities, thus consistently contributing to a better understanding of the international community as regards the situation in Romania.

The position of a participating state, and especially during the Presidency, has allowed Romania an attempt, first, to look "through the glasses of the region" the local realities and to provide expertise that best fit the place and moment for the respective states and not to exacerbate the targets resulting from exercises or schools of thought which had only a speculative basis. Romania has avoided "to point" states of the region (when deviations from their human dimension commitments in the area were highlighted by other OSCE participating states) to highlight their progress in meeting dedicated to various human dimension.

⁶ On the basis of the negotiated mandates by all participating states, including the residence states, the territorial presence of OSCE involves a certain degree of autonomy in respect of the development of their activity. They reflect the activity of accomplishing the mandate of the Permanent Council in reports that are presented to the Presidency who analysis the content for a first evaluation against their mandate and, with the aid of OSCE Secretariat, distributes reports to all participating states, including the host states. This manner of acting increases influencing power of territorial presences in respect of the decisions of the OSCE decident forums, being taken into consideration by the host states. There are situations in which sensible aspects such as the results of the electoral exercises along with the recommendations following these results are not present in the reports of the territorial presences, but are taken into consideration by the election observation missions that are organized by the OSCE institutions with the agreement of the host state. At its turn, the host state might respond to the provisions of territorial presences reports in the course of analysis meetings at the Permanent Council by proving further explanations on the manner it implemented commitments or measures meant to correct the deficiencies. As for the election observation missions' report and the implementation of the recommendations it contains, the host participating states usually take actions by modifying the legislation or the procedures that are evaluated by the election observation mission either wholly or partially. It is important to mention the cooperation character which is intended by such an exercise with the respective OSCE-host state. The meaning of these reports is to help the host state in implementing correctly the human dimension standards in a quite short time span, and not the punishing for non implementation. In some case, such a cooperation approach might prove to be difficult, but at the same time it is the only one that ensures the expected success to a certain degree; the host state has the possibility to oppose the activity of territorial presence on the occasion of the discussions on the continuation of the mandate. For example, in 2009, Russia opposed the adoption of the decision to extend the mandate of the OSCE Mission to Georgia, due to its part of monitoring the separatist region of Tshimvali, recognized only by the Russian Federation as the „South Osetia” independent state.

Thirdly, Romania knew how to listen to the states from Central Asia and Southern Caucasus, to understand and assume their criticism addressed to the countries with consolidated democracies in an effort to engage them into a responsible and a consistent dialogue on human dimension issues.

Fourthly, Romania has directly contributed to the organization's success and flexibility, by defining a personalized approach of each country in the region, as well as by avoiding the line "we" - "them" within OSCE.

Fifthly, but not the last, Romania has contributed with experts to the field missions of these countries involved in shaping specific transformations of these countries. In this sense, I have supported my point of view with some examples, namely: OSCE Mission to Tajikistan, the Centre in Bishkek, Kirghizstan, Centre in Astana, Kazakhstan, Center of Ashghabad, Turkmenistan, OSCE Project Coordinator in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, the OSCE Mission to Georgia, Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman in Office for the conflict dealt with by the Minsk Conference, Center of Yerevan, Armenia and Center of Baku, Azerbaijan.

In the **sixth** chapter, that is entitled **"The press coverage of the CSCE / OSCE process and the contribution of Romania"** I have included the manner in which the research results have been reflected in public sources of the time, issues of interest to CSCE/OSCE and approaches of these topics. The reality of time and the fact that „Scinteia" ("the Spark") newspaper was the only foreign affairs authorized reference to present to the public governmental positions, I resorted to the "Scinteia" articles in a manner that I thought was as less ideological as possible, while retaining important features for policy relevance.

The period between 1965 and 1971 was considered a positive period of Romanian totalitarian history. An increase in living standards was recorded along with the presence of a quite acceptable consumer prices. Moreover, travelling abroad was allowed while culture seemed to return to a relative normality, including freedom of expression. Private property had benefited by the construction of private homes and the temporary support of small businesses.

I have initiated the analysis by presenting the Romanian activity as regards the political scene and its role in the construction of geo-political climate. As shown in the first chapter, CSCE process started few years before the CSCE conference in a period of relative calm regarding the relations between East and West, when an adjustment policy between states with different interests was preferable to the Cold War. The Helsinki Conference was related to the atmosphere of calm that characterized the continent that was confirmed and consolidated by the results of the conference.

During the Conference, Romania had as the highest priority renouncing to force or threatening with in the international relations between participating states. This became a fundamental principle of Romania's foreign policy, a subject that is related to the events of August 1968. Romania's position complicated the military relations within the Treaty of Warsaw, but contributed to the CSCE process, especially during its' first part related to disarmament and the peaceful resolution of disputes – issues that were high on the priority agenda of the conference. By the same token, Romania preserved its interest in maintaining a privileged status on the international scene, which brought prestige and economic benefits.

The European Community and its member states were of the view that CSCE and its corresponding documents have to devote particular attention to create commitments and obligations for the participating states in the field of respect for human rights. At the same time, especially in the Western camp, there was some skepticism, including the famous III-rd basket. This chapter was mainly intended to lead to a decrease of the communism hardness,

but even the West proved to have no insight on the transformation and further unfolding implications of this diplomatic issue⁷.

The Final Act stipulated the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms including the freedom of thought and conscience, religious freedom, irrespective of race, sex, language or religion. The above mentioned Act provided for the promotion and encouragement of the effective implementation of the rights as well as of civil, political, economic, social and cultural liberties, religious freedoms and respect for the rights of minorities, and equality before the law. In the humanitarian cooperation there were also included contacts between people, mixed marriages, family reunification and the right to travel for business. In fact, the substance of the principle of human rights was to introduce in the field of CSCE a democratic and human perspective both unique and of significant lasting effects. The human dimension had been subject to various clashes, resulting to the following “deal”– the acceptance of including the human dimension in the Final Act in exchange for the introduction of the principles of inviolability of borders.

The General European Conference, the 1954 period, the launching the proposal for general European conference were other important steps in the CSCE. In the course of the CSCE, a special role was played by the following reunions:

1. The Meeting in Helsinki 1972 - 1975, where Romania actively participated in the international life, contributing significantly to inter-european dialogue, since it considered the European security issue as national priority;

2. The Meeting in Belgrade (June 15th, 1977 – 8th of March 1978) in Romania's outlook was perceived as being a regress comparing to the Helsinki meeting. In Romania's view, the peace in Europe was an "armed peace". The European continent hosted the most powerful armed forces and means of mass destruction ever existing. There were voices that idealized the "confidence building measures and enhance stability on the continent" - the notification of the large military maneuvers and the invitation of observers to such type of activities were considered insufficient taking into consideration the accelerated rhythm of the arms race. The meeting had as outcome neither the adoption of measures in the military area nor the conditions in respect of the their examination and review, although participating states had repeatedly expressed their concern as regards the military situation in Europe;

3. The Meeting in Madrid (September 9th, 1980 – 9th of September 1983) offered the head of the Romanian delegation, Ambassador Ion Datcu, the opportunity to make a comprehensive presentation of ten concrete proposals issued by Romania as official documents of the meeting ... about the ways and means of development of collaboration, the encouragement of detente, disarmament and security in Europe and worldwide⁸.

⁷ „I, at least, was skeptical at the begining as regards the impact of the III-rd basket. (...) We have supported the III-rd basket of human rights in order to sustain a certain improvement of the hardness aspect of communist regimes, as well as to establish international criteria in order to force the Soviets not to supress riots”- Kissinger sustained. „We could be satisfied with what had been achieved without expecting the credit for our results that personalities such as Havel, Walesa or their contemporaries benefited of and transformed a diplomatic issue in a triumph of human spirit”. (See Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, London, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1999, p. 663)

⁸ „Scînteia”, no. 11.921, 18.12.1980, *Important proposals that Romania presented at the Reunion of Madrid*, page 6

Once more, Romanian proposals lacked any reference to what would have meant the Western understanding of the concept of human rights and freedoms.

The first part of Madrid meeting ended on December 19th, 1980. During the six weeks of debate, both the plenary and the five working groups elaborated a comprehensive assessment of the Helsinki Final Act implementation. The lack of significant results regarding the process of building security on the continent was, in many interventions, combined with the worsening of international political climate. In particular, the importance of efforts regarding the resumption and reinforcement of the European detente was emphasized. The aim of maintaining external legitimacy of the communist regime increased in such a manner that the leadership of Romania, President Nicolae Ceausescu, presented the views and objectives of Romania regarding European security issues during the televised New Year message on the 1st of January 1981.

Between January 27th and March 5th, 1981, a new stage occurred in the meeting proceedings: 85 proposals that had constituted the basis for the formulation of the Madrid meeting final document were discussed. Romanian proposals were to be found in the draft document issued by neutral and non-aligned countries, such as the convocation of the Conference on Disarmament and Confidence in Europe, as part of the CSCE process, the initiatives on increasing cooperation between participating countries in the field of economy, science and technology, as well as the CSCE follow-up. On September 8th, 1983, during the plenary sessions of the second day, Romanian Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei, revealed the positive results of the meeting, sustaining *that Romania considers particularly important the consensus achieved concerning the convocation of the conference on measures to increase confidence, security and disarmament in Europe*⁹.

4. The **Conference on confidence measures, security and disarmament in Europe, Stockholm (January 17, 1984 - 21 September 1986)** aimed as main objective strengthen confidence and security, disarmament, the effective application of the non-use of force principle. The Head of the Romanian delegation, Ambassador Constantin Ene, stressed the importance Romania conferred to the convocation of the conference, as a concrete step towards the achievement of the security and cooperation in Europe. According to Romania, the Conference was designed to act as a negotiating framework to allow effective measures of building confidence and of disarmament based on strict adherence to CSCE norms, to ensure participation of all 35 countries, as equal, sovereign, and independent states, outside of military alliances. The meeting draft document issued by Romania included provisions regarding the contribution of South-Mediterranean states within the conference, working bodies, the rules of procedure, the relationship between the conference and meetings of the CSCE.

Although there were voices that shared the opinion of the failure of the conference, particularly in the situation when no concrete results appeared after the closure of expert meetings on Human Rights in Ottawa and Bern, and contacts between people and the Cultural Forum in Budapest, the conference that was held in the capital of Sweden ended successfully. The success was the outcome of political will of the two great powers to reach agreement and the Summit of the Reykjavik, in the fall of 1986, and appeared as a reward for the efforts of the majority small and medium-size states including Romania.

⁹ For detailed speech see „Scînteia”, no. 12.766, 09.09.1983, *The Position of Romania /.../ regarding the Reunion of Madrid, the immediate and future tasks for the continuation of the edification of security and the development in Europe that were presented by the Romanian ministry of foreign affairs*, page no.8.

5. The **Meeting in VIENNA (November 4th, 1986 - January 19th, 1989)** was organized due to the efforts of totalitarian states to revive their economic development while maintaining the internal organization of the Soviet system. The main cause of Romanian economic failure was represented by the attempt of Nicolae Ceausescu to create an economy based on the industrial revolution model, even when Western economies were in the phase of informational revolution¹⁰. Once more, the Bucharest authorities resorted to applying their dual approach regarding the human rights commitments, mentioning that certain provisions somehow allowed the interference in the internal affairs of other states, violation of national sovereignty and independence, stimulate and encourage retrograde "obscurantist activities and events", stimulated "emigration" and encouraging "theft of intelligence", thus affecting the interests of economic and social development. Therefore, Romania formulated an interpretative statement expressing the refusal to assume any commitment to accomplish the provisions of the Final Document which introduced amendments that had not been accepted and considered inappropriate at that time. The final document was presented in five parts, between 29 December 1989 and 6 January 1990. On 9 January 1990, the newspaper "Adevărul" ("the Truth") announced under the title "Return to Europe", that "according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs official statement, Romania withdrew its reservations and interpretative declarations formulated by the order of the person who had assumed the right to speak and decide on behalf of the people and country".

As regards the conclusions, I would like to emphasize that, despite developments in the organization which were not always as expected, OSCE has remained the only body that offers its participants the comfort that their opinion is taken into account and that there is a dialogue platform in which security issues in all their dimensions are to be addressed. Institutional and regulatory developments of the CSCE process have foreshadowed the establishment of regional organization. Although the ideological strain of thought along with the institutional improvement have been put aside, the "CSCE process" could not play a prominent role in European political life, as expected.

Our continent has been confronted with multiple challenges such as ethnic conflicts and disintegration of states, crisis situations and tensions with destabilizing effects, a deep economic gap between East and West, xenophobic and ultra-nationalist movements in the often violent way. The pan-European forum sometimes stood a secondary place and active role in all the continent's major problems was undertaken by Western European institutions and Euro-Atlantic structures such as NATO, European Union, Council of Europe. "CSCE process" proved to be too often a broad framework of cooperation, did not manage to propose options and solutions other than those issued by proposed by stronger and more active organizations.

Paradoxically, the improvement of the "CSCE process" was accompanied by a certain marginalization. This development occurred largely because of conflicting perceptions on the collapse of "real socialism", views that the abolition of the Warsaw Pact did not lead to the abolition of North-Atlantic Alliance, on the contrary, it maintained its powers, trying to adapt them to the new condition in Europe. The OSCE marginalization was accompanied by attempts to trivialize it, by erosion of procedural and working rules of the involved participating countries that differentiated them over time from traditional multilateral mechanisms. Various experts considered that the most dangerous offense that occurred in this regard was the derogation from the consensus which initiated as the result to stress accumulation in a specific

area of human dimension. In January 1992, the Council of Foreign Ministers decided that, in certain cases of emergency to waive the rule of consensus when making decisions. Thus, the actions of systematic violation of human rights determined Yugoslavia to be sanctioned by *sine die* suspension from the CSCE activity. The decision was made without the state's participation by means of the expression "consensus minus one", which meant, basically, one vote. "CSCE process" digressed, according to certain experts and policy makers, from the mission of consultation and cooperation.

Other participating states, dissatisfied by the particular emphasis on the human dimension, identified the pan-European body with "a court" that "blocked decisions" and "pronounced excommunications". Beyond this approach which, in their opinion, allowed dangerous procedures, a certain state of apathy of small and medium size participating states was observed, especially of the Southern Caucasus and Central Asian countries regarding the OSCE fora, bodies and institutions. They continued to express their views, but practically had no courage to oppose with firmness "the big ones".

Consequently, marginalized and trivialized, "CSCE" had to pay a quite high price for the corresponding originality and force, namely: the absolute equality of rights of participating states and their ability to act accordingly by using the rule of consensus judiciously. If central and eastern European countries acted and intensely waited to be accepted as full-fledged members of Western Europe and Euro-Atlantic organizations with their permanent attraction, the Central Asian and Southern Caucasus participating states did not have such an alternative.

A reversal for the course of "the CSCE process" occurred at the end of the evaluation meeting in Budapest when the Heads of State and Government of participating states had adopted, in December 1994, options and directions of action, designed to confer CSCE a central role as regards the building of a regional and stable, not only united, but also free community. Senior representatives of the 52 participating states reaffirmed on this occasion their commitment to the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the provisions of CSCE documents, as well as their willingness to give new political impetus to the organization by permitting to play an increased role in meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century world. Therefore, to fulfill this mission, CSCE became in January 1995, a regional organization - the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

In the economic and environmental area, OSCE participating states progressed considerably in implementation of the Bonn Document and the Maastricht Strategy. The manner in which the provisions had been implemented by participating States could not have been described as uniform because the application of the document proved to be the topic of discussion or even divergence within the organization. Particular aspects concerning centrifugal trends with negative implications for economic development and hence the stability and security space from Vancouver to Vladivostok have been added.

In the nineties of the last century, the prevention of conflict was seen essentially as a political-military activity to cease the war among states. Nowadays, the conflict prevention approach has changed dynamics due to the fact that security threats are changing. The event of September 11, 2001 was relevant. Nevertheless, the situation today is incomparably better in OSCE area in comparison to the one in 1990. The most important point of stability has been the EU enlargement process and the accession perspective in respect of this area of prosperity and democracy that has proved to be an impressive boost to continue reforms, thus creating the premises for establishing an atmosphere of trust for the individual states and even regions.

In the northern hemisphere a general consensus has been agreed that is necessary for states to pay greater attention to issues of economic and environmental dimension and to address these issues in close relation to the ones which promote human rights, rule of law and democracy. Developments in respect of CSCE/OSCE area have led to the conclusion that the stability and security of States are best assured by the existence of governments which are legitimized by internally accepted democratic processes and by the existence of internal stability having as basis the rule of law and the presence of qualified institutions to apply economic, social, environmental and effective security policies in a democratic system along with a consolidated and legitimate rule of law.

Within the framework of this dimension, states have confirmed a series of principles and objectives that have been agreed by means of dialogue and consensus which are validated by their practical application of the participating states:

- protect the economic rights of citizens, especially those belonging to vulnerable groups, minorities;
- approach the root causes of conflict and promoting measures to reduce poverty, stimulate economic growth and to achieve economic stability in general¹¹;
- promote "good governance" in a comprehensive manner, by reducing the differences as regards institutional capacity at various levels;
- develop an intervention system to stop the degeneration of the conflicts into violent and bloody situations and to determine those indicators that might prevent such conflicts.

Approaching comprehensively and effectively the security threats represents a challenge since it is necessary to pass from the identification of ad-hoc solutions to certain different type of reaction, based on a new "security culture" in Europe not restricted by conventional thinking. As part of this comprehensive approach, the OSCE is the only organization with strong political charge which recognizes that the intensification of cooperation might contribute to strengthening peace, prosperity and security.

In a time span of over 30 years, the organization served, in fact, the ordinary people, trying to implement specific commitments in areas of specific concern and security. Inclusiveness and adopting decisions by consensus are likely to remain, on long term, important issues and enormous advantages for the OSCE.

The spirit of the Helsinki Final Act remains valid for Romania in two aspects: the indivisibility of security and the approach on basis of cooperative dialogue to ensure the security environment. No international organization is perfect being necessary to improve the corresponding efficiency, the establishment of the legal status of this organization to ensure a coherent planning process in respect of financial and operational activity. The international conditions of the present world, the effects of globalization and the consequences of recurrent economic crises, it would be difficult to believe that negotiating a new Decalogue, under current conditions might be possible.

¹¹ The concept is not a new one. On June 5, 1947, when addressing the audience of Harvard University on the occasion of presenting of the plan that would be labeled as the revival of destroyed economies in the second World War, the American general George C. Marshall sustained the fact according to which "there is no political stability without economic security" and that the USA politics would have not to be directed against a particular state or doctrine but "against famine, poverty, despair and chaos".

OSCE has always been an organization that hasn't lacked imaginative and flexible solutions, but its functioning has always been related to the consensus of all participating states. In the case of Southern Caucasus and Central Asian states, OSCE maintains its relevance, especially as a forum for cooperation and dialogue, a school helping those states to choose their configurations according to their free development prospects. Romania's contribution and experience are quite relevant as it provides a model of transition, a catalog of options, achievements and mistakes other states might take into account when analyzing their options.

Member States have had different negotiating mandates leading them to assuming commitments and their implementation, establishing institutions that provide assistance; but these mandates have remained classified, not available for the public at the present moment. Taking into consideration these reasons, the original OSCE documents are presented chronologically in order to allow the analysis of the manner in which the concept of "comprehensive security" has evolved and represent the main source of information for this paper, along with the intensive use of personal experience, either within the organization or as Romanian diplomat accredited to the OSCE. It also includes a number of reference works.

This paper intends to add to the theoretical presentation of Romania's contribution to mitigating the security risks in Southern Caucasus and Central Asia since the establishment of CSCE/OSCE and up to present in a structured manner regarding the "pillars" or "dimensions" of OSCE: the political-military dimension and the security risks arising from political or military threats, the approach of risks that derive from non-compliance with the obligations which are characteristic to human dimension, human rights and non-traditional threats to security appeared especially after the fall of communism on the European continent; risks that derive from the economic aspects of security.

Bibliography is selective. In addition to the literature of CORE or BASIC, which provide a structured approach on general standards of OSCE, the opinions are related to the manner according to which standards have been promoted, mentioning that studies on this subject register a quite reduced number. The practitioners that operate with these instruments are aware of the standards of rules, fact which has determined a certain limitation in respect of the study to primary documents; a possible explanation, but thematic chrestomathies or chronological references have as basis exclusively original documents that are signed and adopted, and presented in the annex. The tools that online libraries have provided such as the ODIHR can be accessed directly from web pages, but these works might be labeled as having a rather normative and not analytic character with the definite purpose of offering those interested the solution "à la carte" from a menu that is accessible to all.

Recent events in Europe, the emergence of the new state of Kosovo which has not been recognized by many countries cast doubts on the viability of the OSCE as a tool for dialogue in promoting security and stability in the region. Although increasingly challenged by several participating states, OSCE efficiency is a landmark in its comprehensive approach, and this work reflects the importance of organization in configuring security structures in Europe and, particularly, in the region that has constituted the theme of the present thesis.

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